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MEDIA INFLUENCE IN THE GHAILANI TRIAL: 
HAVE WE SEEN THIS BEFORE? THE EVER-
GROWING IMPORTANCE OF AN  
INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY  
MICHAEL PERICH

 
What I told the prosecutors and what I will tell you and what I 
spoke to them about is that failure is not an option. Failure is not an 
option. These are cases that have to be won. I don’t expect that we 
will have a contrary result. 
—Attorney General Eric Holder, November 2009.1 
On November 13th, 2009, the Obama Administration proceeded with 
the controversial decision to try suspected terrorists, previously detained at 
Guantanamo Bay, in Article III courts.
2
 In these civilian courts, the alleged 
terrorists were guaranteed the same rights as other criminal defendants.
3
 
This decision started a national debate with different factions of the media 
either praising or condemning the Administration‘s new direction. The 
first alleged terrorist held at Guantanamo Bay tried under this new 
framework was Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, whose trial was presided over 
by Judge Lewis Kaplan.
4
 While other alleged terrorists had been tried in 
the civilian court system, Ghailani‘s trial marked a drastic change in the 
policy concerning the detainees held at Guantanamo Bay. This change led 
to intense media scrutiny of the trial‘s proceedings and the judge‘s 
decisions. 
 
 
  Editor-in-Chief, Washington University Jurisprudence Review; J.D. (2012), Washington 
University in St. Louis School of Law. 
 1. The Case of Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani: A Terrorist Let Off Easy, G.O.P., Nov. 18, 2010, 
http://www.gop.gov/policy-news/10/11/18/the-case-of-ahmed-khalfan (last visited Feb. 12, 2012). 
 2. Eric Holder, Attorney General, Dep‘t of Justice, Announcing Decision to Try 9/11 Suspects 
in NY Civilian Court (Nov. 13, 2009), available at http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/eric 
holder911suspectstrialnewyork.htm. 
 3. These civilian terrorist trials do have some special, requirements but they are largely similar 
to ordinary criminal cases. When compared to the Military Commissions, these trials, much stricter 
evidentiary rules. Id. 
 4. While the United States previously brought charges against other Guantanamo Bay detainees, 
Ghailani was the first alleged terrorist to have his case heard by a judge in an Article III court. The 
American government also allows these trials to be covered by the media, whereas the media coverage 
of the Military Commission set up in Guantanamo Bay is minimal. Military Commissions Act of 2009, 
Pub. L. No. 111-84, tit. XVIII, 123 Stat. 2190, 2574-2614, §§ 948a(7), 948b(a), 948c [hereinafter 
MCA of 2009]. 
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The media has often questioned the decisions of the government 
regarding the most effective means of bringing war criminals and terrorists 
to justice. The earliest example of American skepticism towards these 
types of proceedings is the Nuremberg Tribunals. The media‘s reaction to 
the Second Nuremberg Military Tribunal (―NMT‖) was analogous to those 
of the Ghailani trial.
5
 Similar to the terrorist trials, the prosecution of war 
criminals by the NMT was a nationally important issue. Newspaper 
journalists wrote extensively on the proceedings. Most importantly, the 
scrutiny these judges faced in the media during the NMT appears to have 
had an impact on the final verdicts in the trials, with the sentencing of the 
war criminals often varying upon the degree of media attention that 
particular defendant or trial received.  
This Note will demonstrate that the extensive media coverage in the 
Ghailaini trial affected the final decision reached in the case. Using the 
attitudinal model of judicial decision making as a lens, I will demonstrate 
that the judge‘s decision was ultimately influenced by a variety of external 
factors. Specifically, this is because the media, rather than the courts, 
seemed to decide the ultimate outcome. The possibility that outside factors 
swayed the decisions of Judge Kaplan calls into question the independence 
of the judiciary, which ultimately affects the sense of justice created by 
Ghailani‘s prosecution. To look at the media‘s impact on the Ghailani 
proceedings, this paper will use the NMT proceedings and the media 
impact present in those tribunals to provide a baseline for determining how 
the media affected the Ghailani proceedings. 
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
A pillar of the American court system is the independence of the 
judiciary.
6
 Before delving into the importance of judicial independence, it 
 
 
 5. The Secondary Nuremberg Tribunals were war crime trials that took place in the American 
Zone within Germany. Jonathan Friedman, Law and Politics in the Subsequent Nuremberg Trials, 
1946–1949, in ATROCITIES ON TRIAL: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE POLITICS OF PROSECUTING 
WAR CRIMES 75–77 (Patricia Heberer & Jürgen Matthäus eds., 2008). These trials occurred after the 
initial International Military Tribunals and were set up under the same legal framework. Id. at 79. 
Furthermore, the American government was the only nation in charge of the Secondary Nuremberg 
Tribunals. Id. at 75–77. These trials received extensive media coverage while ongoing. Id. at 91–93. 
 6. Alexander Hamilton stressed the importance of an independent judiciary in the Federalist 
Papers. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (―Periodical appointments, however regulated, 
or by whomsoever made, would, in some way or other, be fatal to [the courts‘] necessary 
independence. If the power of making them was committed either to the Executive or legislature, there 
would be danger of an improper complaisance to the branch which possessed it; if to both, there would 
be an unwillingness to hazard the displeasure of either; if to the people, or to persons chosen by them 
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is helpful to define what it entails. As a normative matter, judicial 
independence means that ―judges should be autonomous moral agents, 
who can be relied on to carry out their public duties independent of venal 
or ideological considerations.‖7 Basically, this means that judges should be 
free from external influences when making their decisions. This normative 
viewpoint is supplemented by an institutional viewpoint which stresses the 
judiciary‘s independence from the other branches of government. For the 
purposes of this Note, I will be focusing on the normative element of 
judicial independence, emphasizing how outside actors, such as the media, 
can influence judges and compromise this aspect of independence. 
Before delving into the importance of the independent judiciary, it is 
necessary to establish a framework to understand the various ways that a 
judge may come to a decision. According to Judge Richard A. Posner, 
judges can decide cases based on nine different processes.
8
 For the 
purposes of this Note, however, I will focus on the two main theories of 
judicial decision making: the legalist and attitudinal models.
9
 In essence, 
the legalist model asserts that judges will only decide cases based on legal 
precedent, statutes, and the constitution and divorce their decision from 
outside influences, such as pressure from the media, peers, or politics: 
―Legalism, considered as a positive theory of judicial behavior . . . 
hypothesizes that judicial decisions are determined by ‗the law,‘ conceived 
of as a body of preexisting rules found stated in canonical legal 
materials.‖10 On the other hand, the attitudinal model of judicial 
decisionmaking posits that a judge bases her decisions on her personal 
politics rather than precedent. Essentially, the attitudinal model claims that 
―judges‘ decisions are best explained by the political preferences that they 
bring to their cases.‖11 While the attitudinal judge will use precedent as a 
means to justify her decision, the basis of her ruling stems what she thinks 
is the best outcome of the case rather than what precedent indicates that 
the outcome should be.  
 
 
for the special purpose, there would be too great a disposition to consult popularity, to justify a 
reliance that nothing would be consulted but the Constitution and the laws.‖). 
 7. John Ferejohn, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Explaining Judicial Independence 
72 S. CAL. L. REV. 353, 353 (1999). 
 8. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 19 (2008). 
 9. In Posner‘s book, he describes the nine different theories of judicial decisionmaking. But he 
places particular emphasis on the attitudinal and legalist models because these are the two most often 
forwarded by academics. Id. 
 10. Id. at 41. 
 11. Id. at 19–20. 
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From a normative stand-point, the concept of an independent judiciary 
is firmly rooted in the legalist theory of judicial decisionmaking. A legalist 
judge makes her decision based upon legal precedent divorced from 
outside influence such as pressure from the media, peers, or politics.
12
 
Support for this assertion can be seen by delving into the common 
understanding of what constitutes an independent judiciary. The history of 
the concept of judicial independence is particularly illustrative in this 
respect. 
Protecting and ensuring we have an independent judiciary has been a 
consistent ideal in our nation‘s political system. Since the founding of the 
United States, political thinkers have argued for an independent judiciary 
in order to effectively enforce the laws of the land. In 1802, James 
Asheton Bayard, in his speech ―Plea for An Independent Judiciary,‖ urged 
the House of Representatives, when they were debating concerning the 
Judiciary Bill, about the need for an independent judiciary in the United 
States.
13
 Here, Bayard focused on the normative aspects of judicial 
independence. He argued that an independent judiciary is essential to the 
well-being of society, stating that independent judges would rule 
according to the laws and not in accordance with their personal 
connections.
14
  
Modern legal theorists have also identified the necessity of maintaining 
an independent judiciary. In the opening of Justice as Fairness: A 
Restatement,
15
 Rawls points to the presence of an independent judiciary as 
one of the fundamental requirements for achieving justice in a democratic 
society.
16
 Further, Associate Justice Breyer supports this viewpoint 
regarding the necessity of the independent judiciary.
17
 In his work 
Independence of the Judiciary, Justice Breyer maintains that judicial 
independence is necessary so that judges decide cases based upon the laws 
of the land rather than their own whims.
18
 Both judges and scholars have 
 
 
 12. Id. at 80. 
 13. James Asheton Bayard, Plea for an Independent Judiciary, in 4 A LIBRARY OF AMERICAN 
LITERATURE: FROM THE EARLIEST SETTLEMENT TO PRESENT TIME 246 (Edmund Clarence Stedman & 
Ellen Mackay Hutchinson eds., 1888). 
 14. Bayard contrasted his proposed American system with that of England, which he felt had far 
greater influence on judges. Id. 
 15. JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 10 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001) 
 16. Id. 
 17. Stephen G. Breyer, Judicial Independence in the United States, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 989, 989 
(1995–96). 
 18. Id. (―[The] independent judiciary . . . [serves as] the basis for a society in which people and 
the government behave according to rules of law, rather than according to the will or whim of 
powerful rulers.‖). 
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recognized the importance of maintaining a judiciary free from outside 
influence.  
Courts have often emphasized their independence from the other 
branches of the government, demonstrating the importance that the 
judiciary places on its institutional independence. Frequently, courts assert 
independence by using the political question doctrine.
19
 In a wide variety 
of cases, the judiciary has evoked the political question doctrine in order to 
ensure that the courts do not become involved in issues that are 
fundamentally political in nature.
20
 Courts have also emphasized the 
importance of an independent judiciary when deciding questions that do 
not fall under the political question doctrine. For instance, in United States 
v. Will, the Court reaffirmed the necessity for independence, stating that 
―[a] [j]udiciary free from control by the Executive and Legislature is 
essential if there is a right to have claims decided by judges who are free 
from potential domination by [the] other branches of government.‖21 As 
the aforementioned instances demonstrate, courts have been careful to 
assert their independence from the political branches to maintain their 
impartiality. 
 Various legal treaties and books designed to teach individuals about 
the legal system of the United States supports both the institutional and the 
normative aspect of judicial independence. For instance, books that are 
meant to teach non-lawyers about how the court functions do not mention 
that outside influences might impact the judges.
22
 Rather, these books 
focus on legal precedent and the interpretation of statutes. They indicate 
that judges should be free from outside influence in order to render just 
decisions. Contrary to the theory of judicial decision making posited by 
the attitudinal model, there is no indication in these books that politics or 
personal opinions might influence a judge‘s decision. This viewpoint is 
also adopted by many introductory law text books where the focus is 
placed on precedent and statute interpretation and not about how judge‘s 
personal politics might influence the decision.
23
 Nowhere in these sources 
do the authors mention that judges are influenced by the outside world. 
Instead, these books adopt the theory of judicial independence, supporting 
the legalist theory of judicial decision making. 
 
 
 19. See generally Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 20. For instance, in Goldwater v. Carter, the Supreme Court refused to determine whether the 
President had the authority to revoke treaties. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 999–1002 (1979). 
 21. United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 217–18 (1980). 
 22. See, e.g., BRENT E. ZEPKE, LAW FOR NON-LAYWERS (1983). 
 23. See, e.g., GERALD PAUL MCALINN ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN LAW (2005). 
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In spite of all the rhetoric and academic arguments supporting the 
notion of an independent judiciary, judicial decisions are frequently 
influenced by the whims of the populace. Judges have indicated that they 
have looked at public opinion when making their final decisions on 
politically charged cases, lending support to the attitudinal model of 
judicial decision making.
24
 For instance, in Dennis v. United States,
25
 
Justice Black noted that the Justices of the Court looked at public opinion 
before making their decision, stating that ―[p]ublic opinion being what it 
now is, few will protest the conviction . . . .‖26 Academics have also agreed 
that the judiciary is susceptible to public pressure.
27
 A modern day 
example can be seen in the opinions of Justices O‘Connor, Kennedy, and 
Souter in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.
28
 In 
this case, Bruce Fein argued that the Justices ―expressly justified their 
votes by the fear that overruling Roe would be portrayed in the media as a 
surrender to anti-abortion advocates.‖29 These examples illustrate that 
judges, at times, allow outside factors, such as the media, to dictate their 
decisions as demonstrated by the media‘s ability to influence judicial 
opinions and affect the independence of the judiciary.  
The increasing politicization of the judiciary has made it so that judges 
do not always base their decisions only on precedent for fear of public 
reprisal. This stands in direct contrast to the normative aspect of judicial 
independence, which aims to protect the judiciary from outside pressures 
and influence. In spite of the judiciary‘s institutional safeguards that 
 
 
 24. Justice Holmes warns of the difficulties of making good law with emotionally stirring cases. 
N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400–01 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (―For great cases 
are called great, not by reason of their real importance in shaping the law of the future, but because of 
some accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts the 
judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes what 
previously was clear seem doubtful, and before which even well settled principles of law will bend.‖) 
(emphasis added). Justice Jackson echoed this point of view, expressing the importance of an impartial 
judiciary. Bruce Fein & Rodney A. Smolla, First Amendment-Does Media Coverage Influence the 
Outcome of Judicial Decisions?, 78 ABA. J. 48, 48 (1992) (―To paraphrase Justice Robert Jackson, 
their [legal opinions‘] vitality should not turn on the vicissitudes of political controversy or journalistic 
passions.‖) (emphasis added). 
 25. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 581 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting) (explaining that the 
public would not challenge Dennis‘s conviction though Justice Black believed Dennis‘s statements 
were protected under the First Amendment). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Christina E. Wells, Fear and Loathing in Constitutional Decision-making, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 
115, 117 (2005) (―The normative argument that courts ought to protect civil liberties in times of crisis 
is an attractive one. . . . [But courts] remain subject to the same passions, fears, and prejudices that 
sweep the rest of the nation.‖). 
 28. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 29. Fein & Smolla, supra note 24. 
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protect their independence, politicians and the media have openly 
condemned the actions of the judges instead of the underlying legal rules 
and regulations.
30
 In effect, these condemnations can cause the judges to 
alter their position, leading them to vote a certain way even if that ruling is 
not legally correct.
31
 This suggests that outside influence emmanating 
from the media or politicians can affect the independence of the judiciary. 
This occurs despite the fact that if Congress wishes to overturn a judicial 
decision, they can pass a new law or a constitutional amendment to 
indicate their opposition to the court‘s decision and not harm judicial 
independence.
32
 Even though scholars, practitioners, and judges proclaim 
the importance of the independent judiciary, there are certain instances 
that demonstrate that the judicial branch is not truly independent and its 
final rulings can be affected by outside influences. 
The theory of the independent judiciary is firmly rooted in the concept 
of legalism.
33
 Judges who are members of an independent judiciary are not 
influenced by outside factors. Rather these judges are supposed to use 
legal cannons arrive at a decision in a case. As various academics, 
textbooks, jurists, and politicians have indicated in their writings, judges, 
if they adhere to the concept of an independent judiciary, should decide 
cases divorced from their own personal feelings of the case.
34
 Judges that 
decide cases based upon this legalist framework are said to be upholding 
the ―rule of law,‖ implicitly giving credibility to the decisions made by the 
American judiciary. If a judge were to stray from this definition, the 
 
 
 30. A pertinent example of the polarization of judges occurred in Iowa, where the public 
removed several Iowa Supreme Court judges from office because of these judge‘s controversial 
decision to legalize same-sex marriage. A.G. Sulzberger, Ouster of Iowa Judges Sends Signal to 
Bench, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/04/us/politics/ 
04judges.html?_r=1. In this case, rather than changing the judicial decision by passing a new 
constitutional amendment, Iowans sought to punish the judges for their interpretation of the law. Id. A 
similar case can be made for the Supreme Court nomination process in which judges‘ decisions are 
scrutinized not for their understanding of the law but for their political viewpoints. For instance, the 
judicial confirmation hearing of Justice Sotomayor focused more on her politics than her judicial 
decisions. See Dahlia Lithwick, The Rational Hysterics: Republicans Won’t Beat Sonia Sotomayor by 
Attacking Her as Too Darn Human., THE DAILY BEAST, May 25, 2009, http://www.thedailybeast.com/ 
newsweek/2009/05/25/the-rational-hysterics.html. 
 31. See Fein & Smolla, supra note 24; Gregory A. Caldeira, Public Opinion and The U.S. 
Supreme Court: FDR’s Court-Packing Plan, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV., 1139, 1139–40 (1987).  
 32. For instance, Article II of the Constitution provides for impeachment if judges abuse their 
positions or engage in illicit activity. U.S. Const. art. II, § 4, cl. 1. Similarly, Congress can pass laws 
which can overturn a judicial decision. 
 33. Harry T. Edwards & Michael Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies that Attempt to 
Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895, 1913 n.37 (2008–
2009). 
 34. Id. at 1897. 
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decisions that she made would be called into question by members of our 
society, since the judge would be using her own viewpoints (or outside 
factors that have influenced her decision) to decide a case rather than 
basing it on the foundational elements of the American legal system. 
Hence, a judge who decides a case based (at least partially) on the legalist 
model would be adhering to the concept of the independent judiciary and 
thus gives her decisions validity when judged against the backdrop of the 
―rule of law.‖  
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON THE PROSECUTION OF WAR CRIMES IN 
THE UNITED STATES 
Military commissions have been used to try enemy combatants
35
 since 
the Revolutionary War.
36
 During the Revolutionary War, the American 
government established its first military commissions to try, convict, and 
sentence enemy spies.
37
 Subsequent armed conflicts used military 
commissions to try prisoners of war.
38
 In fact, during the Civil War, the 
American government used these commissions extensively to try 
Confederate prisoners of war.
39
 A commonality in these early cases was 
the presence of an ongoing military conflict with a recognized nation.
40
  
A. A Brief History of the Use of Military Tribunals in the United States 
during World War II 
One of the most influential cases about military commissions was Ex 
Parte Quirin.
41
 The Quirin case contained a petition of habeas corpus by 
non-uniformed Nazi soldiers who were found on American soil.
42
 Their 
intention was to destroy various transportation and industrial facilities to 
 
 
 35. The Fourth Circuit used Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), to define an enemy combatant as 
―[o]ne who takes up arms against the United States in a foreign theater of war, regardless of his 
citizenship, may properly be designated an enemy combatant and treated as such.‖ Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516 (2004) (internal citations omitted). 
 36. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 42 n.14 (1942).  
 37. Christopher M. Evans, Terrorism on Trial: The President’s Constitutional Authority to Order 
the Prosecution of Suspected Terrorists by Military Commission, 51 DUKE L.J. 1831, 1836–37 (2002). 
 38. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 106-111 (Jordan J. Paust et al. 
eds., 3d ed. 2007). 
 39. Id. at 1837. 
 40. Id. (―Military commissions were also used extensively during the Civil War to try offenses 
against the laws of war.‖). 
 41. Evans, supra note 37, at 1842. 
 42. Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21 (―While landing they wore German Marine Infantry 
uniforms or parts of uniforms. Immediately after landing they buried their uniforms and the other 
articles mentioned and proceeded in civilian dress to New York City.‖). 
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hamper the American war effort.
43
 These Nazi soldiers were found off the 
shores of Long Island and Florida with large quantities of explosives. The 
defendants argued it was unconstitutional to try them by a military 
commission when federal courts were available. The Court determined 
that ―the detention and trial of petitioners—ordered by the President in the 
declared exercise of his powers as Commander in Chief of the Army in 
time of war and of grave public danger—are not to be set aside by the 
courts without . . . clear conviction.‖44 The Court further emphasized that 
the Constitution does not require ―that offenses against the law of war be 
tried before a jury.‖45 Finally, the Court determined that ―unlawful 
combatants‖ may be tried before military commissions if they intended to 
engage in hostile acts concerning the destruction of property or life,
46
 
setting forth the necessary requirements for trying an individual under a 
military commission when Article III courts were a viable option.
47 
 The Nuremberg Trials marked the last time that the United States used 
military tribunals to prosecute enemy combatants on a large-scale.
 
The 
Nuremberg trials came in two phases, the initial Nuremberg International 
Military Tribunals (―IMT‖), followed by State-specific military trials.48 
One month after the formal opening of the IMT, the Allied Control 
Council overseeing Germany‘s occupation passed Control Council No. 
10.
49
 This established a uniform legal basis for trying Nazi war criminals 
following the conclusion of the IMT.
50
 Control Council No. 10 authorized 
each State to try war crimes in its respective military zone.
51
 It also 
 
 
 43. Evans, supra note 37, at 1842 (―They arrived armed with various explosive devices intending 
to disrupt America‘s war effort by destroying transportation and industrial facilities throughout the 
United States. The saboteurs were, however, apprehended and taken into custody by the FBI.‖). 
 44. Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25. 
 45. Evans, supra note 37, at 1843. 
 46. Id. at 1844 (―The eight German saboteurs had been apprehended wearing civilian clothes 
rather than their military uniforms ‗during time of war,‘ with the intent to commit ‗hostile acts 
involving destruction of life or property,‘ and were acting as agents of an enemy nation at war with the 
United States—the Third Reich.‖) (internal citations omitted). 
 47. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516 (referencing Ex parte Quirin as the legal standard which the 
American government must meet to prove that Hamdi was an enemy combatant). 
 48. The United States and Allied governments used the International Military Tribunals to try the 
heads of the Nazi government for war crimes. Subsequently, each Allied government formed their own 
methodology for dealing with the less well-known war criminals. In the United States, this method was 
the Nuremberg Military Tribunal, which used American judges and prosecutors to try alleged Nazi war 
criminals. See generally TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL 
MEMOIR (1992). 
 49. Control Council 10 was the main international instrument used to establish the various state-
specific military tribunals. Friedman, supra note 5, at 76–77. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
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permitted German courts to engage in these proceedings by trying war 
criminals, with the stipulation that the Allies supervise these 
proceedings.
52
 The crimes which Control Council No. 10 listed were 
crimes against peace,
53
 war crimes,
54
 crimes against humanity,
55
 and 
membership in organizations proclaimed criminal by the IMT.
56
 
Control Council No. 10 made it possible for the creation of the 
Secondary Nuremberg Military Tribunals (―NMT‖), which were under the 
complete power of the American government.
57
 The verdicts reached in 
each of these zones were international in nature. This obviated the need for 
subsequent rounds of international military tribunals to prosecute lesser 
Nazi war criminals because the guilty lesser Nazi war criminals could be 
brought to justice on the international stage.
58
 Each power decided who 
they would indict based upon the individuals in their custody.
59
 Control 
Council No. 10 also allowed for extradition between allies for specific war 
criminals who might have committed crimes in other territories or military 
zones.
60
 This offered greater flexibility and efficiency, as defendants were 
transferred into areas where the strongest case could be made against 
 
 
 52. Control Council No. 10, art. III(1)(d), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imt10.asp 
(―Such tribunal may, in the case of crimes committed by persons of German citizenship or nationality 
against other persons of German citizenship or nationality, or stateless persons, be a German Court, if 
authorized by the occupying authorities.‖). 
 53. Id. art. II(1)(a) (―Crimes against Peace: Initiation of invasions of other countries and wars of 
aggression in violation of international laws and treaties, including but not limited to planning, 
preparation, initiation or waging a war of aggression, or a war of violation of international treaties, 
agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of 
any of the foregoing‖). 
 54. Id. art. II(1)(b) (―War Crimes: Atrocities or offenses against persons or property constituting 
violations of the laws or customs of war, including but not limited to, murder, ill treatment or 
deportation to slave labour or for any other purpose, of civilian population from occupied territory, 
murder or ill treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public 
or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by 
military necessity‖). 
 55. Id. art. II(1)(c) (―Crimes against Humanity: Atrocities and offenses, including but not limited 
to murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhumane 
acts committed against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds 
whether or not in violation of the domestic laws of the country where perpetrated‖). 
 56. The Charter also defined membership in a criminal group or organization as a crime. Id. art. 
II(1)(d) (―Membership in categories of a criminal group or organization declared criminal by the 
International Military Tribunal‖ ). 
 57. See generally TAYLOR supra note 48. 
 58. Friedman, supra note 5, at 76–77. 
 59. Control Council 10, supra note 52, art. III(1)(a-d). 
 60. TELFORD TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ON THE NUERNBERG 
WAR CRIMES TRIALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, 10–13 (U.S. Gov‘t Printing Office, 
1949) [hereinafter Final Report]. 
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them.
61
 In the American zone, from 1946 to 1949
62
 the NMT conduct 
twelve trials and prosecuted a variety of German war criminals from 
virtually all of the professions present in the Third Reich.
63
 Despite the 
breadth of defendants, the IMT overshadowed the importance of the 
American-led NMT as a source of international legal precedent.
64
 
Nevertheless, the NMT constitutes the last instance of large-scale military 
trials conducted by an American military commission.
65
 
B. Military Commissions in the Twenty-First Century 
The military commissions established by the Bush Administration in 
the wake of September 11th are the latest large-scale application of 
military commissions to try enemy combatants. Initially, the Bush 
Administration attempted to authorize the formation of military 
commissions to try suspected terrorists without Congressional approval.
66
 
President Bush sought to justify these trials through his constitutional 
powers as Commander-in-Chief of the military.
67
 However, in Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court rejected this position, stating that the 
President must have Congressional authority in order to establish these 
non-Article III courts.
68
 Consequently, Congress passed the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006 to set up the military commissions, establish the 
procedures for these commissions, and define who could be tried as an 
enemy in these courts.
69
 However, the Court in Boumediene v. Bush 
declared unconstitutional the Military Commissions Act of 2006 because it 
did not offer an adequate and effective substitute for habeas corpus review 
of the alleged terrorists‘ cases.70 
 
 
 61. Friedman, supra note 5. 
 62. Final Report, supra note 60. 
 63. In chronological order, the twelve cases of the Subsequent Nuremberg trials—included the 
Medical Case, Milch Case, Justice Case, Pohl Case, Flick Case, Farben Case, Hostage Case, RuSHA 
Case, Einsatzgruppen Case, Krupp Case, Ministries Case, and the High Command Case.TAYLOR, 
supra note 60, at 127, 162, 241; see generally Friedman, supra note 5. The first trial to open was the 
Medical Case which began on November 11, 1946, and the last case to close was the Ministries Case 
which came to a conclusion on April 14, 1949. TAYLOR, supra note 60; Id. at 127, 162, 241. 
 64. Id.  
 65. Id. 
 66. Michael Mukasey, The Obama Administration and the War on Terror, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL‘Y, 953, 958 (2010). 
 67. Jeffery Addicott, Efficacy of the Obama Policies to Combat Al-Qa’eda, the Taliban, and 
Associated Forces-The First Year, 30 PACE L. REV. 340, 349–50 (2010). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2240 (2008) (―We hold that those procedures are not 
an adequate and effective substitute for habeas corpus.‖). 
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The Supreme Court‘s decision in Boumediene corresponded with 
President Obama‘s election to the presidency, which resulted in a change 
in policy regarding the use of military commissions. When President 
Obama took office, he initially declared his intention to close the 
Guantanamo Bay detention facility within a year of assuming office and 
end the use of military commissions.
71
 Obama‘s rationale for this decision 
appeared to be two-fold. Not only did he seek global support for the 
American-led war on terror, but he also stated his desire to reinstate the 
idea that the United States was a nation of laws.
72
 But, as Obama‘s first 
year in office progressed the political realities and public concern over the 
fate of the terrorists detained at Guantanamo Bay made keeping these two 
promises nearly impossible.
73
 Therefore, following the ruling in 
Boumedeine, President Obama urged Congress to pass the Military 
Commission Act of 2009 which set forth military commission procedures 
which were similar to those of a court martial hearing.
74
 Additionally, this 
Act gave alleged enemy combatants the right of habeas corpus
75
 and 
recourse to review the legality of their detentions.
76
 
In conjunction with reinstating the military commissions, President 
Obama promised to use Article III courts to prosecute some of the 
defendants.
77
 The Obama administration stated that these trials would be 
held in New York, just miles away from Ground Zero.
78
 This decision 
created much debate in the media and political realm. Conservatives were 
uniformly opposed to giving the terrorists civilian trials.
79
 These pundits 
and politicians thought that civilian trials were not the best forum for these 
cases due to the sensitivity of information that each side would enter into 
evidence.
80
 Further, they thought that holding the terrorist trials in Article 
 
 
 71. Addicott, supra note 67, at 354. 
 72.  Exec. Order 13,492, 3 C.F.R. 13492 (2010), available at http://www.white house.gov/ 
the_press_office/ClosureOfGuantanamoDetentionFacilities/. 
 73. Addicott, supra note 67, at 354. 
 74. See generally MCA of 2009, supra note 4. 
 75. Addicott, supra note 67, at 349; Mukasey, supra note 66. 
 76. Addicott, supra note 67, at 349. 
 77. Id. 
 78. The Obama Adminstration‘s decision to hold a civilian terrorist trial was not new. Under the 
Bush Administration, some terrorists were tried in the domestic sphere, notably Zacarias Moussaoi and 
Richard Reid. Mukasey, supra note 66, at 959. Further, prior to September 11, many terrorists were 
tried in civilian courts. Id. For instance, Osama Bin Laden was initially indicted in a civilian court. US 
v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264, 264 (S.D. NY 2000). 
 79. See, e.g., Boehner: ‘No Way’ Terrorist Trials Will Be Held in New York, FOXNEWS.COM, 
Jan. 27, 2010, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/01/27/boehner-way-terrorist-trials-held-new-
york/ [hereinafter Boehner].  
 80. Id. (―‗There is not going to be a trial in New York, I guarantee it. There is no appetite for the 
trials in Congress,‘ Boehner, R-Ohio, said.‖). 
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III courts was a national security risk because of the heightened possibility 
of terrorists attacking the courts that heard the trials.
81
 On the other hand, 
liberal media outlets and politicians lauded the decision of the Obama 
Administration.
82
 These individuals thought that the civilian trials would 
not affect the final decisions of the cases, would reinstate the rule of law in 
America, and would help to garner international favor for the ―War on 
Terror.‖83 This debate continues today, especially with the decision 
rendered in the Ghailani Trial. 
Ahmed Ghailani was the first suspected terrorist and Guantanamo Bay 
detainee to be tried in an Article III court since Congress passed the 
Military Commissions Act of 2009.
84
 The American government accused 
Ghailani of being an al-Qaida operative. To support this, the United States 
introduced evidence that pointed to his alleged role in the 1998 bombings 
of United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. These attacks took 224 
lives and Ghailani allegedly had a large role in the operation and execution 
of these atrocities.
85
 Out of the 285 counts against him, the jury convicted 
Ghailani for one count of conspiracy to damage or destroy U.S. property.
86
 
The media hotly debated the success of this verdict. Some factions thought 
that it restored the integrity of the American judicial system whereas 
others pointed to the verdict as a failure.
87
  
 
 
 81. Id. 
 82. See, e.g., Heather Horn, One Year Later, Gitmo Still Open, ATLANTIC WIRE, Jan. 22, 2010, 
http://www.theatlanticwire.com/opinions/view/opinion/One-Year-Later-Gitmo-Still-Open-2282. 
 83. Id.  
 84. The Ghailani trial was the first civilian terrorist trial. Holder, supra note 2. In this case, the 
jury convicted Ghailani on one of two-hundred-and-eighty-five counts. Nichols & Johnston, infra note 
166. The ultimate sentence for Ghailani is twenty years-to-life. Weiser, infra note 175. The verdict in 
this trial reignited the national debate between holding the terrorist trials in military commissions or 
continuing with civilian trials for some terrorists. Phil Hirschkorn, Ghailani Trial Reignites Terror 
Justice Debate, CBS EVENING NEWS WITH KATIE COURIC, Nov. 20, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/ 
8301-500803_162-20023492-500803.html. 
 85. Hirschkorn, supra note 84. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Many of the individuals who thought that the trial was a failure pointed to the strict 
procedural and evidentiary requirements needed in an Article III court. See, e.g., Warren Richey, 
Terror Case: Is One Conviction and 284 Acquittals a Success?, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 
Nov. 18, 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2010/1118/Terror-case-Is-one-conviction-and-
284-acquittals-a-success. These individuals believe that due to the difficulty of obtaining evidence in 
terrorism cases, Courts should be more lenient in allowing contested evidence to be entered into the 
record. See id. Conversely, many judicial scholars and human rights advocates have pointed to the fact 
that these trials were a success because it shows that America is still a land of laws and not of mob 
justice. See id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
362 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 4:349 
 
 
 
 
III. MEDIA INFLUENCING JUDGES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY BETWEEN THE 
SECONDARY NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND THE CIVILIAN 
TERRORIST TRIALS  
In order to view the possible extent of media influence on the judiciary, 
it is necessary to look at high-profile judicial decisions that elicited 
widespread media attention. It is also helpful to look at these high-profile 
trials over a long period of time to determine if media influence on the 
independent judiciary is a new or reoccurring phenomenon. Finally, it is 
useful to look at a high-profile case that did not take place on American 
soil to determine if the media was able to influence the judges‘ decisions 
in a more remote geographic setting. To this end, the final decisions 
rendered in the NMT and the first civilian terrorist trial, Ghailani, are case 
studies in high profile cases where judicial independence could be called 
into question because of media partiality. Both trials contained issues that 
deeply impacted the American public and received widespread media 
attention despite their differences in both time and place. Additionally, the 
NMT took place during the 1940s while the final verdict in the Ghailani 
trial was handed down on January 25, 2011. Finally, the NMT took place 
on German soil whereas the Ghailani trial took place just blocks away 
from the September 11th terrorist attacks. These factors combined 
demonstrate that the media has been influencing the judiciary in high-
profile cases for an extended period of time, regardless of the geographic 
location.  
The decisions rendered by the judges in the NMT aid in discerning the 
possible influence of the media on an Article III court. The comparison 
between the NMT and the Ghailani trial is not a perfect one. Regardless, 
the reaction of the American public to the atrocities that the Nazis and the 
terrorists acts committed were similar, and so was the media coverage that 
influenced the final decision of the judges in these highly contentious 
cases.  
A. An Earlier Case Study: The Industrialist Trials of the NMT  
Through newspaper articles, the American media managed to relay the 
opinion of the American public to the officials in charge of or involved 
with the Nuremberg proceedings, which likely affected the final verdicts 
of the NMT.
88
 When the concern of the American government shifted 
 
 
 88. See TAYLOR, supra note 48 (discussing the presence of a large press corps, which had the 
sole purpose of reporting on the trials, and noting that even though this press corps diminished as the 
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away from the threat of German resurgence toward the Cold War, the 
media‘s perception of the NMT also changed. An excellent example of 
this change can be seen in the so-called Industrialist Trials, whose 
defendants consisted of the German industrialists who controlled Flick 
Combine, I.G. Farben, and Krupp Industries. The disinterest that the 
American media displayed toward the continuation of the industrialist 
proceedings seems to have validated the ideas proposed by American 
government officials who viewed the German industrialists as tools to 
combat the rise of communism.
89
 Further, this disinterest in the 
Industrialist Trials could be seen in the opinions and verdicts delivered by 
the tribunal judges. 
Prior to the start of the NMT, the American government attempted to 
indict Gustav Krupp, the head of Kurpp industries, for war crimes in the 
IMT, such as enslavement and deportation of Jews or German prisoners as 
well as plundering.
90
 But, due to errors made by American prosecutors, the 
Nuremberg court deemed that Gustav was too sick for trial
91
 and the court 
concluded that Gustav could not be tried in absentia.
92
 In response to this, 
Justice Jackson, the lead American prosecutor in the IMT, tried to 
substitute Alfried Krupp for his father for using Krupp Industries to 
engage in the same crimes.
93
 When Jackson presented the judges with his 
request, he was flatly and publicly denied.
94
 This decision by the IMT 
judges created a large controversy in the media, which viewed the failure 
to indict Alfried Krupp with a sense of despair.
95
 Headlines all across 
America reflected this disappointment. One such example is an Associated 
Press article in the Atchison Daily Globe of Atchison, Kansas, which titled 
its article ―Krupp Family Not To Be Represented At Nuernberg.‖96 This 
article outlined the reasoning behind the failure, and emphasized that the 
decision to reject the proposed substitution took the judges a mere twenty-
 
 
trials progressed, all of the final verdicts of the NMT still received some form of media coverage). 
 89. See WILLIAM MANCHESTER, THE ARMS OF KRUPP: 1587–1968, 618–21 (1968). 
 90. 1 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL: NUREMBERG 75 (U.S. Gov‘t Printing Office, 1947), 
available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_Vol-I.pdf. 
 91. AIERY NEAVE, NUREMBERG: A PERSONAL RECORD OF THE TRIAL OF THE MAJOR NAZI WAR 
CRIMINALS IN 1945–46, at 47 (1978). 
 92. In absentia refers to being tried while not being present in the court. TAYLOR, supra note 48, 
at 153–56. 
 93. Id.  
 94. Id. 
 95. Associated Press, Krupp Family Not To Be Represented At Nuernberg, ATCHISON DAILY 
GLOB., Nov. 17, 1945 at 1 [hereinafter Krupp Family]. 
 96. Id. Notably, this wire article was reprinted across the United States. See, e.g., George Tucker, 
Nurenberg Trial to Start Tuesday: Tribunal Rules Out Younger Krupps as Defendant, THE EVENING 
INDEPENDENT, No. 17, 1945, at 1. 
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one seconds.
97
 Furthermore, the editor positioned the article on the front 
page directly beneath a picture of the Senate hearing regarding Pearl 
Harbor, only adding to the bleak tone of the article.
98
 This article mirrored 
the tone of the nation in its dismay at the failure of the Krupp indictment.
99
 
In addition to wire stories, editorials that began to surface were printed 
supporting the substitution of Alfried Krupp for his father, Gustav. An 
editorial published in the Zanesville Signal stated that both Krupps should 
be indicted for their crimes.
100
 The author, however, argued that a 
substitution of Gustav for Alfried should not occur because the court 
should allow Gustav Krupp to be tried in absentia instead of court 
deciding to try Gustav.
101
 On top of this point, the author referenced the 
initial desire of the American government to try Alfried Krupp separately 
in the proceedings for his own war crimes.
102
 Ultimately the author 
concluded that ―[i]t might be better to combine the British and American 
proposals. Let old Krupp [Gustav] be tried in absentia, not as a symbol but 
as what he is. And let his son also be tried on his own record.‖103 This 
editorial supports the growing discontent among the American public over 
how the court handled the Krupp episode. Many Americans simply could 
not comprehend the reasoning behind not trying both Krupps in front of 
the IMT, for both, in the public‘s opinion, were clearly guilty of war 
crimes.  
As the trials continued, American interest in prosecuting German 
industrialists for war crimes lessened. The Flick trial aptly demonstrates 
the waning public interest in the actual atrocities committed by the 
industrial magnates.
104
 Freidrich Flick and his cohorts were charged with 
war crimes, crimes against humanity, enslavement and deportation of 
individuals under Nazi control, membership in the SS, and being a Nazi 
party member.
105
 The media tended to marginalize the Industrialist Trials 
 
 
 97. Krupp Family, supra note 95 (―The request of Justice Robert H. Jackson chief prosecutor that 
30-year-old Alfried Krupp tried in the place of his father, Gustav Krupp Von Bohlen Und Halbach, 
was disposed of in a session which lasted exactly 21 seconds.‖).  
 98. Id.  
 99. Felix Morley, Editorial Comment, Travesty of Justice, CHESTER TIMES, Nov. 27, 1945, at 1. 
 100. C.C. Stebbins, Crime and Punishment, THE ZANESVILLE SIGNAL, Nov. 11, 1945, at 1. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id.  
 104. Compare Walter Winchell, Nemesis at Nuremberg, THE CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Dec. 4, 
1946, at 9, with Associated Press, Fancy Bathtub Craving of Hitler Made Public, WALLA WALLA 
UNION-BULL., June 9, 1947 at 4 [hereinafter Bathtub] (describing a letter about Hilter‘s bathtubs as 
potential evidence in the ―Flick concern‖). 
 105. 6 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS: ―THE FLICK 
CASE‖ (U.S. Gov‘t Printing Office, 1952) [hereinafter THE FLICK CASE], available at http://www.loc 
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as exemplified in ―Fancy Bathtub Craving of Hitler Made Public‖ 
published in the Walla Walla Union-Bulletin of Washington.
106
 The author 
only briefly mentions Freidrich Flick, head of the Flick combine, in 
passing, stating that ―[t]hey are charged with helping to form the German 
war plan.‖107 While the article mentioned some aspects of the indictment, 
it ignored the remainder of the indictment, such as Flick‘s membership in 
the SS.
108
 The article omitted some of the most inflammatory charges, 
such as the slave labor and plunder allegations.
109
 Newspapers across 
America imitated the tone set by this article.
110
 Many articles only briefly 
mentioned the slavery and plunder charges and either failed to report on 
the issue or offered only a short statement about the verdict.
111
 In 
neglecting these elements, authors marginalized the proceedings by 
focusing on a mundane aspect of the trials and failing to elaborate on the 
crimes of the Flick Combine. 
Similar to the declining public interest in the Flick Trial, reporting on 
the I.G. Farben Trial faced a decline in popular interest. The executives of 
I.G. Farben were charged with planning and engaging in an aggressive 
war, enslavement and deportation of individuals under Nazi control, war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, and membership in the SS.
112
 In contrast 
to the outrage that stemmed from the failure to try Alfried Krupp, the 
newspaper articles written about I.G. Farben moved away from the 
previously condemnatory tones as exemplified by a front page article 
printed in the Daily Capital News of Jefferson City, Missouri
113
 
Considering the article was printed during the initial phases of the I.G. 
Farben trial, this article demonstrates the shift between stories printed 
before the start of the trial and those published afterward.
114
 Whereas prior 
articles belittled the industrialists, this exposé praised some of the 
 
 
.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/ NT_war-criminals_Vol-VI.pdf. 
 106. Bathtub, supra note 104.  
 107. Id. 
 108. Id.  
 109. Id.; THE FLICK CASE, supra note 105, at 10–11. 
 110. See, e.g., Associated Press, Flick, Associates, DIXON EVENING TELEGRAPH, Dec. 22, 1947, at 
6; Robert Young, Ask U.S. Court to Free German at Nuernberg, THE CHICAGO DAILY TRIB., Mar. 17, 
1948, at 15. 
 111. Young, supra note 110 (citing with approval statements of Flick‘s defense counsel accusing 
the prosecution of being communists).  
 112. 7 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS: ―THE 
FARBEN CASE‖ 10–11 (U.S. Gov‘t Printing Office, 1952) [hereinafter THE FARBEN CASE], available at 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/ NT_war-criminals_Vol-VI.pdf. 
 113. Associated Press, Donald Doane, Farben Directors Charged With Fostering Wars, DAILY 
CAPITAL NEWS, Aug. 27, 1947, at 1. 
 114. Id. 
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accomplishments of the Farben executives prior to the Second World 
War.
115
 The shift in tone strongly supports the idea that the public‘s 
interest in the outcome of the trials was declining. 
As the trials progressed toward their final verdicts newspaper articles‘ 
tone and placement changed, reflecting a growing public apathy about the 
trials grew. An example of this decline is the media‘s attention over the 
course of the Krupp trials, which initially started with much fervor and 
ended in indifference.
116
 In a front-page story regarding the Krupp verdict 
in the Chillicothe Constitution Tribune, the author stated the Krupp verdict 
in a matter of fact tone, in marked contrast to the hyperbolic phrases used 
earlier on in Krupp‘s proceedings.117 A large portion of the article 
summarized the crimes that Alfried Krupp and his associates 
committed.
118
 Despite this summation, the article failed to give in-depth 
details regarding the severity of these crimes by embedding pertinent 
details in large, long-winded paragraphs.
119
 This placement enabled 
apathetic readers to easily pass over the list of crimes committed by 
Krupp‘s company, which further evidences the public‘s growing 
disinterest in Nazi war crimes. 
Following the Berlin Blockade, publications regarding the Industrialists 
Trials declined notably. The Berlin Blockade marked a turning point in 
relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, leading to the 
escalation of Cold War tensions and impacting the volume, content, and 
tone of the articles printed in the ensuing months.
120
 Pieces printed 
concerning Alfried Krupp appear to indicate this shift.
121
 Furthermore, the 
infrequency with which the New York Times published articles about the 
Krupp Trial reflects waning public interest in the outcome of the trials. 
Between the late winter of 1947 and the summer of 1948, the New York 
Times printed just four articles concerning the Krupp Case, as compared to 
the numerous stories printed prior.
122
 A parallel shift in article content 
tracks this same decrease in public attention. For instance, the editor of the 
Moberly Monitor-Index surrounded an article entitled ―Krupp Officials 
 
 
 115. Id. (stating that all the defendants were ―outstanding men in business or science in pre-war 
Germany.‖). 
 116. Krupp Family, supra note 95. 
 117. Compare Associated Press, Krupp Munition Works Officials are Convicted, CHILLICOTHE 
CONSTI.TRIB., July 31, 1948, at 1 [hereinafter Krupp Munition Works], with Stebbins, supra note 100. 
 118. Krupp Munition Works, supra note 117. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See generally JOHN MAN, BERLIN BLOCKADE (1973). 
 121. Alfried Krupp was the most famous of the industrialist defendants. See generally 
MANCHESTER, supra note 89. 
 122. Id. at 613. 
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Acquitted on Two War Crimes Counts‖ with stories about communism.123 
Additionally, the author wrote in a very detached tone and decided to only 
briefly cite facts.
124
  
As time progressed, the American public seemed to not want to read 
about the atrocities of the Third Reich. Whereas initially newspaper 
articles were long and full of detailed analysis, later journalists and 
newspaper editors opted for succinct articles about the continuing trials. 
Rather than focusing on the continuing trials, the American media turned 
to more pressing international issues. The reporters accomplished this task 
by vilifying communists while lauding the accomplishments of capitalism. 
This shift in media coverage of the Industrialist Trials appears to have 
affected the final punishments delivered by the judges in the NMT 
proceedings. The judges of the industrialist trials appeared attuned to the 
feelings of the American public as well as the American government. As 
the judges handed down the verdicts of the NMT, each sentence seemed to 
correlate with the amount of public attention a particular trial received, 
indicating that they may have been influenced by the media.
125
 Both the 
length of the verdicts and the final sentencing suggests the judges‘ 
reluctance to harshly punish the industrialists in light of the international 
events of the period. 
The sentences of those convicted in the Industrialist Trials only 
decreased with the passage of time. This can best be seen by looking at the 
relevant sentences of the lead defendants for each company. In the Flick 
Trial, Friedrich Flick was sentenced to seven years in prison. In the trial of 
I.G. Farben leaders, many of the heads of the combine were acquitted. 
Only two heads received larger sentences than Friedrich Flick, Walter 
Durrfeld who oversaw the construction of Auchwitz and Otto Ambros 
who oversaw the production of Auchwitz.
126
 Therefore, it is significant 
that the two heads of I.G. Farben who were intimately involved in the 
construction and operation of Auchwitz received a sentence that was one 
year longer than that of Flick, who did not run such a brutal camp. Next, 
Alfried Krupp received a minimal sentence. While he initially received 
twelve years in prison, he was released shortly after his imprisonment. 
Moreover, this sentence was significantly smaller than the sentence he 
 
 
 123. Associated Press, Krupp Officials Acquitted on Two War Crimes Counts, MOBERLY 
MONITOR-INDEX, Apr. 5, 1948, at 2. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See infra text accompanying notes 126–27. 
 126. Auchwitz was the worst of the camps created by the Industrialists. YISRAEL GUTMAN & 
MICHAEL BERENBAUM, THE ANATOMY OF AUSCHWITZ, at i (1994). 
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would have received if he was tried in front of the IMT where most of the 
defendants were sentenced to death.
127
 Considering there was popular 
American support for trying Alfred in front of the IMT, the comparison is 
important because it seems to indicate that over time the American public 
became less interested in the outcome of the trials. So, while Krupp‘s 
sentence did not decrease in relation to the other defendants, it certainly 
decreased from the amount of jail time Krupp likely would have received 
if he was actually tried in front of the IMT. This seems to indicate that 
over time the lack of media furor surrounding the case allowed for the 
judges to operate in a more legalist framework, rather than succumbing to 
the pressures of the American media. 
Once the American public‘s attention to the Industrialist Trials and the 
horrific crimes these industrialists perpetrated diminished, the American 
High Commissioner commuted the sentences of many of the convicted 
industrialists.
128
 This decision allowed the sentenced industrialist Nazis to 
retain all their previously held property and reintegrate into German 
society.
129
 The media did not write any articles about the commutations of 
the convicted industrialists‘ sentences. The lack of articles published on 
this point seems to indicate that the American public no longer cared about 
punishing the industrialists. The once impassioned rhetoric present at the 
onset of the trials gave way to the publication of more factual stories. The 
papers that opted to report on the release of the industrialist prisoners did 
so in purely factual tone, not belying any underlying anger that once 
existed.
130
 When looking at the amount of media coverage that the release 
of the industrialists received, it seems that the American public had lost 
interest in their fate. 
From the failure of the Krupp indictment to the final verdicts of the 
Industrialist Trials, the American media seems to have influenced the 
formation and execution of the NMT proceedings. Once the NMT began, 
waning public support for the trials, seemed to have helped with the 
decision of the U.S. government to rapidly conclude the trials.
131
 The 
 
 
 127. Quincy Right, The Law of the Nuremberg Trial, 41 AM. J. INT‘L L. 38, 38 (1947). 
 128. John J. McCloy, Approach to Clemency Decisions, WKLY. INFO. BULL., May 1951, at 11. 
 129. Id. 
 130. In this article, John McCloy published his response to a letter that Eleanor Roosevelt wrote to 
him concerning his decision to free Nazis from jail. Id.  
 131. Various newspaper articles printed as the trials went on turned from a very aggressive stance 
regarding the Nazi industrialists toward presenting articles concerning the industrialists in a more 
factual nature. This transition can most easily be seen in the descriptions of the defendants. Compare 
Nazi Rivalry on Loot Shown in Flick Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1947, at 23, with Bathtub, supra note 
104. 
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increasing Cold War tensions and extreme length of the trials led to this 
decline in popular support among the American public.
132
 With the 
American media focusing its reporting on the amplification of Cold War 
tensions, a correlation appears between the importance of a given 
defendant and the length of his sentence, seeming to indicate that the 
American judges noticed this shift and acted accordingly. The American 
public no longer desired to punish Nazi industrialists who were capable of 
effectively halting the spread of communism into Germany.  
From this, I believe we can draw a reasonable inference that the judges 
in the industrialist trials attempted to balance the legal rules of the case 
with the pressure put on them by the media to hand down a harsh sentence. 
This was not an easy task given the politically and emotionally charged 
nature of the NMT trials. When analyzing the cases in light of the 
newspaper articles published during the time, it becomes clear that judges 
might not be able to maintain a legalist attitude when the subject is hotly 
contested. The Krupp case provides the best example of this approach. 
Initially, the American public and, presumably, the judges were angry 
when the court excluded Gustav and Alfried Krupp from being tried in 
front of the IMT. Having not been able to try Krupp in abstentia in the 
initial Nuremberg proceedings, the American public seemed eager to hand 
Krupp and his fellow industrialists a harsh sentence. Flick, the first 
industrialist, received such a harsh sentence. When it came time for 
Krupp‘s trial, the American public had begun to emphasize the danger 
posed by communism and looked to industry to combat it.
133
 In response, 
the initial cries for a harsh punishment for Krupp were tapered and he 
ultimately received a negligible punishment, first calling for the death 
penalty and then receiving a twelve year sentence that was commuted 
without any public protest. This abatement in public opinion allowed for 
the judges to strike a balance between the public and the laws demands. 
This same balancing effort can be seen in the later case of Ghailani. 
B. Civilian Terrorism Trials: Ghailani Case Study 
During President Obama‘s first term in office, he indicated that his 
administration would try alleged terrorists in Article III courts rather than 
the special military commissions used by the Bush Administration.
134
 This 
 
 
 132. MANCHESTER, supra note 89 (stating that the Cold War impacted the final outcome of the 
Krupp trials because of public fear concerning communism). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Holder, supra note 2. 
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drastic change in policy elicited great media attention. Ghailani was the 
first individual fully prosecuted by the federal government in this new 
framework.
135
 Given the unprecedented nature of the Ghailani trial, the 
media paid close attention to the proceedings. Further, they criticized the 
various decisions rendered by the court. Both the great attention placed on 
Ghailani‘s trial and the political pressure to convict Ghailani for being a 
terrorist seem to have affected the decisions that Judge Kaplan made 
throughout the case. 
Many pundits were unsure of the possible effectiveness of the civilian 
trials and the likelihood that these alleged terrorists held at Guantanamo 
Bay would be ultimately convicted for their alleged crimes.
136
 However, 
neither the media nor the Obama Administration emphasized the possible 
problems of outside influence in the civilian terrorist trials. Rather, both 
groups pointed to the fact that the civilian terrorist trials would reinstate 
the rule of law in America because the alleged terrorists would be tried in 
Article III courts like normal criminals rather than in a military 
commission.
137
 They thought that condemnation by civilian courts would 
do more to protect the integrity of the American judicial system.
138
 
However, when the court failed to convict the accused both sides viewed 
this as a failure of the judicial system, rather than evidence that an 
innocent man was spared from an unjust punishment.
139
 
Throughout the Ghailani trial, the media also debated the relevance of 
the enhanced interrogation techniques used on the alleged terrorists held at 
Guantanamo Bay, including Ghailani.
140
 Prior to the trial, the media used 
an indifferent tone when discussing the use of enhanced interrogation 
 
 
 135. Jason Leopold, A Campaign Promise Dies: Obama and Military Commissions, TRUTHOUT, 
Apr. 4, 2011 (originally published on Mar. 8, 2010), http://www.truth-out.org/the-unmaking-a-
campaign-promise-obama-and-military-tribunals57493.  
 136. Brian Montopoli, Republicans Outraged Over Terrorist Trial, CBS NEWS (Nov. 13, 2009), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-5635009-503544.html. 
 137. Holder, supra note 2. While civilian terrorist trials would help to reinstate the rule of law, it 
would only help in so far as these trials maintained their independence and did not allow outside 
sources to influence the final decision. 
 138. Ghailani Trial Underscores Federal Courts’ Ability To Prosecute Terrorism Suspects, Says 
ACLU, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.aclu.org/national-security/ghailani-
trial-underscores-federal-courts-ability-prosecute-terrorism-suspects-say. 
 139. Andy Worthington, The Rule of Law and the Ghailani Case, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM 
FOUNDATION (Nov. 23, 2010), available at http://www.fff.org/comment/com1011m.asp. 
 140. Michael J. Lebowitz, The Value of Claiming Torture: An Analysis of al-Qaeda’s Tactical 
Lawfare Strategy and Efforts to Fight Back, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT‘L L. 357, 362 (2010). From an 
international law standpoint, enhanced interrogation is torture. See generally Jordan J. Paust, Executive 
Plans and Authorizations to ViolateInternational Law Concerning Treatment and Interrogation of 
Detainees, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT‘L L. 811 (2004–2005). Therefore, throughout this Note, I will be 
using the terms enhanced interrogation and torture interchangeable.  
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techniques on Ghailani. The first articles published about this topic related 
to whether Ghailani‘s case should be dismissed if he was tortured while in 
CIA custody.
141
 These articles did not editorialize on whether the case 
should be dismissed or not. Rather, the journalists used a very matter of 
fact tone when reporting on the proceedings, frequently giving the 
government the benefit of the doubt.
142
  
Judge Kaplan‘s opinion of the dismissal claim mirrored the media‘s 
tone and language. When the defendants moved for dismissal on the 
grounds that Ghailani was subject to enhanced interrogation techniques, 
Judge Kaplan did not delve into whether the alleged techniques were used 
or the possible ramifications of torture to Ghailani‘s human or legal 
rights.
143
 He rejected the defense‘s argument that the case should be 
dismissed because American government officials allegedly tortured 
Ghailani. Rather, Judge Kaplan indicated that it did not matter to the 
integrity of the legal proceedings if Ghailani was tortured or not while in 
CIA custody, stating that ―[c]ertainly the government should not be 
deprived here ‗of the opportunity to prove his guilt through the 
introduction of evidence wholly untainted by [any government] 
misconduct.‘‖144 Additionally, Judge Kaplan emphasized the retributive 
nature of Ghailani‘s claims145 as well as the fact that the government 
would not be relying on any information they obtained during Ghailani‘s 
 
 
 141. Ghailani‘s defensive team was trying to dismiss the case because CIA interrogators allegedly 
used these ―enhanced interrogation techniques‖ on him before the CIA detained Ghailani at 
Guantanamo Bay. See, e.g., Benjamin Weiser, Terror Suspect’s Lawyer Asks for Dismissal of Case, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2010, at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/12/nyregion/12 
ghailani.html; Alison Gendar, Time to Drop Charges Against Accused Al Qaeda Embassy Bomber 
Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, Attorney Says, DAILY NEWS, Jan. 12, 2010, http://www.nydailynews.com/ 
news/world/2010/01/12/2010-01-12_time_to_drop_charges_free_terror_suspect_atty_sez.html; Lawyer 
Cites Torture for Wanting Charges Dropped Against Gitmo Detainee, FOXNEWS.COM, Jan. 11, 2010, 
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2010/01/11/lawyer-cites-torture-wanting-charges-dropped-gitmo-detainee/ 
[hereinafter FOXNEWS.COM, Wanting Charges Dropped]. 
 142. For instance, the Fox News article stated: ―Quijano [the defense counsel] says Ghailani was 
subject to so-called ‗enhanced interrogation methods‘ for 14 hours over five days and was denied trial 
for four years.‖ FOXNEWS.COM, Wanting Charges Dropped, supra note 141. However, nowhere in 
this article does the author condemn the government‘s actions. Id. In fact, the journalist framed the 
statements in such a manner that gives the government the benefit of the doubt; some readers might 
think that the government did not employ ―enhanced interrogation techniques‖ when questioning 
Ghailani, even though the opposite was true. 
 143. United States v. Ghailani, 751 F. Supp. 2d 502, 508 (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2010). 
 144. Id. at 506 (alteration in original). 
 145. Id. at 505 (―In seeking dismissal of the indictment, however, he does not deny that he is 
being afforded every protection guaranteed to all in the defense of criminal prosecutions. Rather, 
Ghailani in effect argues that the case should be dismissed to punish the government for its 
mistreatment of him before he was presented in this Court to face the pending indictment.‖) (emphasis 
added). 
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time in CIA custody.
146
 On top of these statements, Judge Kaplan 
summarily dismissed Ghailani‘s speedy trial defense that related to a delay 
in his trial because of his alleged torture, citing that there was no 
compelling reason to go forward with it.
147
 Like those writing in the 
media, Judge Kaplan appeared indifferent toward alleged torture of 
Ghailani. 
From late May 2010 till early October 2010, the stance of the media 
and the views evident in Judge Kaplan‘s opinions changed once the 
government attempted to use information acquired through enhanced 
interrogation techniques.
148
 Initially, when Judge Kaplan decided to allow 
the case to proceed to trial, the journalists‘ tone did not change, again 
reporting the facts and refraining from personal judgment or the use of the 
charged words present in the defendant‘s brief—like the defendant‘s 
lawyer‘s assertion that Ghailani‘s alleged torture amount to an outstanding 
due process violation.
149
 However, this tone changed when the government 
attempted to introduce evidence obtained through enhanced interrogations. 
Journalists, with the exception of some commentators from conservative-
leaning news sources, such as Fox News, universally panned the use of 
torture to extract information.
150
 Articles published in various news outlets 
condemned the use of torture, with some authors calling for the Obama 
Administration to investigate the alleged use of torture by government 
officials during the Bush Era.
151
 Additionally, journalists started to publish 
articles concerning the possible use of medical officials in aiding the 
CIA‘s enhanced interrogations.152 These types of stories were written with 
 
 
 146. Id. at 506.  
 147. Id. at 505 (―In this case, Ghailani has not identified explicitly the component of his due 
process rights that allegedly was violated.‖). 
 148. See, e.g., James Risen, Medical Ethics Lapses Cited in Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 
2010 at A6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/07/world/07doctors.html. 
 149. A Business Week article buried the argument of the defense in the case, placing it towards 
the end of the article where the readers are less likely to read. Furthermore, while Hurtado made sure 
to quote all of the inflammatory language used by the defense, she placed the judge‘s responses 
directly after the quotations. See, e.g., Patricia Hurtado, U.S. Judge Refuses to Dismiss Indictment of 
Guantanamo Detainee Ghailani, BUSINESS WEEK, May 10, 2010, available at http://www.bloomberg 
.com/news/2010-05-10/u-s-judge-refuses-to-dismiss-indictment-of-guantanamo-detainee-ghailani.html. 
 150. See, e.g., Boehner, supra note 79; David Alexander, CIA Briefed 68 Lawmakers on 
Interrogation Program, REUTERS, Feb. 23, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/02/24/us-usa-
security-interrogation-idUSTRE61N0WE20100224; Jason Ryan, Torture Investigation: Bush-DOJ 
Attorneys ‘Exercised Poor Judgment,’ ABC NEWS, Feb. 19, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/ 
torture-investigation-president-george-bush-era-doj-attorneys/story?id=9892348. 
 151. Jim Nintzel, Torture: The GOP’s Default Position?, TUCSON WEEKLY, Feb. 15, 2010, 
http://www.tucsonweekly.com/TheRange/archives/2010/02/15/torture-the-gops-default-position.  
 152. Leonard S. Rubenstein & Stephen N. Xenakis, Doctors without Morals, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 
2010 
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very harsh tones and condemned the use of these techniques by the CIA.
153
 
Furthermore, some newspaper articles stressed the importance of the 
Ghailani trial, thinking that it would help to determine whether 
information gathered through these enhanced interrogation techniques 
would be allowed in civilian terrorist trials.
154
 
Judge Kaplan directly addressed the media‘s stance in his decision on 
the admissibility of evidence procured through enhanced interrogation. His 
decision reflected the negative public sentiment concerning government 
use of enhanced interrogation to obtain information from alleged 
terrorists.
155
 In his July 2010 opinion, Judge Kaplan took note of the 
popular opinion surrounding the trials and was sympathetic to the public 
outrage that stemmed from the terrorist attacks.
156
 He nevertheless stated 
that public anger over terrorism attacks could not influence his decision as 
this would be ―unacceptable in a country that adheres to the rule of 
law.‖157 Therefore, Judge Kaplan seemed to be in touch with the 
viewpoints expressed in the media and in the populace at large. But, 
instead of ignoring these viewpoints, he directly addressed them to justify 
the proceedings.
158
 
As both his August and October 2010 opinions demonstrate, Judge 
Kaplan took notice of public opinion surrounding the trial, he still strove 
to adhere to the rule of law. In these opinions, Judge Kaplan ruled on 
whether information obtained through enhanced interrogation would be 
 
 
 153. For instance, Larry Neumeister of the Associate Press stated that: ―After the Sept. 11, 2001, 
attacks, the CIA used 10 harsh methods, including waterboarding, a form of simulated drowning.‖ 
Larry Neumeister, Tanzanian Who Supplied Explosives Testifies in U.S., MIAMI HERALD (Sept. 16, 
2010), http://www.miamiherald.com/2010/09/16/1828454/tanzanian-who-supplied-explosives.html. 
 154. See, e.g., Carrie Johnson, Guantanamo Detainee’s Trial May Set Tone For Others, NAT‘L 
PUB. RADIO (Sept. 27, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130103644 
(noting that the Ghailani trial could create an important precedent regarding whether information 
obtained through enhanced interrogation will be allowed at trial). 
 155. See generally United States v. Ghailani, No. S10 98 Crim. 1023(LAK), slip op., 2010 WL 
4006381 (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 6, 2010). 
 156. United States v. Ghailani, 751 F. Supp. 2d 515, 519 (S.D.N.Y., July 12, 2010) (―It [the 
Government] could not lawfully give vent to the outrage felt both here and in Africa at these 
murderous attacks on innocent civilians. It would be obliged to release him if hostilities with Al Qaeda 
were to end. This prosecution therefore serves at least two purposes that our government could not 
lawfully achieve without an appropriate conviction—to pass a moral judgment on and to punish 
Ghailani if in fact he committed the alleged crimes.‖). 
 157. Id. at 520. 
 158. In a New York Times article, Weiser noted the close connection present between parts of 
Judge Kaplan‘s opinion and the on-going debate in the media surrounding the legitimacy of the trials. 
Benjamin Weiser, Judge Refuses to Dismiss Terror Suspect’s Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2010, at 
A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/14/nyregion/14ghailani.html (noting that Judge 
Kaplan made this statement in reference to the ―political debate about trying terrorists in civilian courts 
. . .‖). 
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allowed at trial. In particular, Ghailani‘s defensive team wanted to exclude 
the testimony of Hussein Abebe, a man whose whereabouts became 
known through Ghailani‘s enhanced interrogation.159 In his August 
opinion, Judge Kaplan balanced public outrage over terrorism with the 
fundamental principles of the American judiciary system. Although many 
of the facts surrounding the opinion are redacted, the legal defense of 
Ghailani remained almost entirely intact.
160
 Ghailani‘s defense centered on 
the ―Fruit of a Poison Tree‖ doctrine which states that no evidence or 
witnesses can be entered into at trial if either party obtained this evidence 
or witness by illicit means.
161
 Rather than showing deference to the 
government‘s arguments, Judge Kaplan dismissed the government‘s 
argument for allowing Abebe as a witness stating he was skeptical about 
the government‘s ability to obtain this information without torture.162 He 
ruled that ―the Court does not have the requisite high level of confidence 
that the government would have obtained Abebe’s testimony about 
Ghailani’s statements [without the use of ―enhanced interrogation 
techniques‖ on Ghailani].‖163 Here, he demonstrated that he was skeptical 
about the government‘s ability to obtain this information without torture.  
In October 2010, Judge Kaplan ultimately decided that Abebe could 
not testify in Ghailani‘s trial. Nevertheless, Judge Kaplan made certain to 
address the public outrage concerning the terrorist attacks. In a brief two-
page opinion, he stated that: 
The Court has not reached this conclusion lightly. It is acutely 
aware of the perilous nature of the world in which we live. But the 
Constitution is the rock upon which our nation rests. We must 
follow it not only when it is convenient, but when fear and danger 
beckon in a different direction. To do less would diminish us and 
undermine the foundation upon which we stand. Moreover, it is 
appropriate to emphasize that Ghailani remains subject to trial on 
the pending indictment, that he faces the possibility of life 
imprisonment if convicted, and that his status as an ―enemy 
combatant‖ probably would permit his detention as something akin 
to a prisoner of war until hostilities between the United States and 
 
 
 159. United States v. Ghailani, 743 F. Supp. 2d 242, 242 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 17, 2010). 
 160. See generally id. 
 161. Id. at 249–54. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 254 (emphasis added). 
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Al Qaeda and the Taliban end even if he were found not guilty in 
this case.
164
 
Not only does Judge Kaplan express regret at his decision to not allow 
Abebe as a witness, but he even mentions that regardless of the verdict, 
Ghailani will likely remain imprisoned indefinitely due to his status as an 
enemy combatant. This statement demonstrates that Judge Kaplan was 
acutely aware of the public reaction his opinion was going to receive. 
Therefore, he decided to preemptively justify his opinion, noting that, 
regardless of the outcome of the case, Ghailani would likely be imprisoned 
for the remainder of his life as an ―enemy combatant.‖ 
Although his viewpoints mirrored those expressed in the media, Judge 
Kaplan‘s legal conclusions were firmly based in the law of the United 
States and not his own viewpoints. Therefore, even though language of 
this opinion demonstrates that he did take into account the viewpoints of 
the media, he did not let the media control the admissibility of evidence 
gained from enhanced interrogation. Instead, Judge Kaplan re-asserted the 
idea that the United States was a nation of laws.
165
  
Ultimately, the jury only convicted Ghailani on one of 285 counts, 
conspiracy to destroy a federal building. This caused uproar in the media 
despite the fact that Ghailani could still receive a life sentence for his 
crime.
166
 Newspaper articles denounced the acquittal of Ghailani on 284 
counts.
167
 Following the decision, journalists and political commentators 
turned skeptical about the effectiveness of the civilian terrorist trials.
168
 
The media‘s major issue with these trials was the possibility that the 
alleged terrorists would go free if not convicted of a crime. The media felt 
this way in spite of Judge Kaplan‘s attempts to assuage their fears by 
indicating that Ghailani‘s status as an enemy combatant would likely keep 
 
 
 164. Ghailani, 2010 WL 4006381 at *1–*2. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Ghailani was convicted of one count of conspiracy to destroy U.S. buildings and property. 
Hans Nichols & Nicholas Johnston, Ghailani Verdict Won’t Close Trial Options, Gibbs Says, 
BUSINESS WEEK, Nov. 18, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-11-18/ghailani-verdict-
won-t-close-trial-options-gibbs-says.html. This conviction carried a sentence of 20 years to life in 
prison. Id.  
 167. See, e.g., James Gordon Meek, Ahmed Ghailani’s Acquittal on Nearly All Counts in Embassy 
Bombings Case Has Big Repercussions, DAILY NEWS, Nov. 18, 2010, http://www.nydaily news.com/ 
news/ny_crime/2010/11/18/2010-11-18_ahmed_ghailanis_acquittal_on_nearly_all_counts_in_embassy 
_bombings_case_his_big_.html?r=news. 
 168. Charlie Savage, Ghailani Verdict Reignites Debate Over the Proper Court for Terrorism 
Trials, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2010, at A18, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/19/us/19 
gitmo.html. 
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him imprisoned for life, regardless of this trial‘s verdict.169 Notably, none 
of these newspaper articles discussed the possibility that any of the alleged 
terrorists held at Guantanamo Bay might actually be innocent, as if the 
trials function was only to determine the level of guilt of the defendant, 
not their guilt or innocence. 
Judge Kaplan‘s final sentencing in the Ghailani case demonstrates his 
personal anger at Ghailani and similar terrorists, which mirrors the outrage 
present in the media over the verdict. For instance, in Ghailani‘s 
sentencing hearing, Judge Kaplan stated that he believed that Ghailani was 
an al-Qaeda operative despite the vigorous protests of Ghailani‘s defense 
counsel to the contrary.
170
 While he did not overturn the jury‘s decision 
during the sentencing proceedings, he all but rendered their decision moot. 
He noted that, regardless of the jury‘s decision, he believed Ghailani to be 
a member of the terrorist organization and should be punished 
accordingly.
171
 This led to Judge Kaplan sentencing Ghailani to life in 
prison, the maximum possible sentence for his conviction.
172
 Considering 
this was the maximum sentence even if the jury convicted Ghailani on all 
counts, Judge Kaplan managed to make the singular conviction of the jury 
have the same weight as if Ghailani was a full member of al-Qaeda and 
actively sought to destroy American embassies. 
In support of his ruling, Judge Kaplan stated that, ―[a] sentence must be 
imposed that, in addition to other things, makes it crystal clear that others 
who engage or contemplate engaging in deadly acts of terrorism risk 
enormously serious consequences . . . .‖173 Some media outlets reported 
that Judge Kaplan gave this maximum sentence to silence ―critics of the 
jury‘s verdict by rendering the defendant‘s acquittal on 284 out of 285 
counts all but meaningless.‖174 Judge Kaplan even went as far as to say 
that regardless of how Ghailani was treated while in detention at American 
facilities, ―the impact on him pales in comparison to the suffering and the 
horror that he and his confederates caused.‖175 He further emphasized his 
 
 
 169. Id.  
 170. Phil Hirschkorn, Ghailani Judge: Civilian Trials Work, CBS NEWS, Jan. 30, 2010, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/01/30/national/main7299759.shtml. 
 171. Id. (―In determining his sentence, Kaplan went beyond trial evidence, which proponents of 
military commissions had worried would be limited by the strict rules of admissibility in federal 
court.‖). 
 172. Nichols & Johnston, supra note 166. 
 173. Hirschkorn, supra note 170. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Benjamin Weiser, Ex-Detainee Gets Life Sentence in Embassy Blasts, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 
2010 at A19, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/26/nyregion/26ghailani.html?_r=1 (internal citations 
omitted). 
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disdain for Ghailani throughout the trials, condemning Ghailani for actions 
he was not convicted for but nonetheless caused as sustained by evidence 
that was not admitted at trial.
176
 Judge Kaplan concluded by indicating that 
even though the jury only convicted Ghailani on one count of 285, he 
nevertheless ―knew and intended that people would be killed as a result of 
his own actions and of the conspiracy that he joined . . . .‖177 Finally, 
Judge Kaplan emphasized that Ghailani‘s conviction was supported by the 
trial record and that he received the same sentence as he would have been 
given if Ghailani would have been convicted of all 285 counts. 
Judge Kaplan‘s decisions throughout the Ghailani trial seem to indicate 
that he took into account the media when entering in his final judgments. 
In certain instances, such as his October opinion, Judge Kaplan explicitly 
acknowledged the media while entering his judgments. He even went as 
far as to justify his decision by indicating that, regardless of the decision 
he reached, Ghailani would still be imprisoned for life. Finally, the 
excerpts taken from Judge Kaplan‘s statements during the sentencing 
hearing seem to indicate that Judge Kaplan‘s final sentencing decision was 
influenced by public opinion. Not only does he use evidence not admitted 
at trial, but he indicated that he used the sentence to send a message to 
other would-be terrorists. 
The opinions rendered in Judge Kaplan‘s opinions in the Ghailani 
cases demonstrate that a judge is more apt to utilize her personal beliefs in 
high profile cases, thus conforming to the attitudinal model of judicial 
decisionmaking. While Judge Kaplan did base his decisions on legal 
precedent, the outcomes of his decisions seem to match-up to the various 
stories printed in newspapers across the United States and, in that sense, 
mirror the viewpoints of the public. After the public demonstrated growing 
discontent about the use of enhanced interrogation techniques, Judge 
Kaplan wrote an opinion that strongly rebuked the practice. But Judge 
Kaplan‘s comments surrounding Ghailani‘s sentence best indicate that he 
allowed outside factors to influence his decision. It should be noted that 
Judge Kaplan attempted to balance his personal beliefs with legal 
precedent. None of his decisions were contrary to legal precedent and all 
were well within his power as a judge. Therefore, even though Judge 
Kaplan might have allowed outside factors to influence his decision, he 
 
 
 176. Id. (―‗It was a cold-blooded killing and maiming of innocent people on an enormous scale,‘ 
Judge Kaplan said. ‗The very purpose of the crime was to create terror by causing death and 
destruction.‘‖). 
 177. Id. 
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still used legal precedent as a framing device, which serves to uphold the 
integrity of his decision.  
C. An Independent Judiciary?: Comparing the Verdicts of the NMT and 
Ghailani 
The decisions rendered in both the NMT and the Ghailani trial indicate 
that the media affects the ultimate outcomes of high-profile trials. The 
Industrialist Trials of the NMT support this conclusion. As public support 
for the trials began to wane so did the severity of sentences. Similarly, the 
Ghailani trial illustrates how public anger over the proceedings and 
verdict led to the harsh sentence handed down by Judge Kaplan on 
January 25, 2011. Interestingly, these case studies demonstrate that the 
media had the potential to impact high profile trials regardless of the time 
period, type of crime, or geographic location.  
Judges are human; they are not robots who render decisions devoid of 
emotion. It is understandable that high profile cases might cause a judge to 
succumb to outside influences. But, this should all be viewed against the 
backdrop that one of the most important elements of the American legal 
system is the independent judiciary. Without one, judges would be able to 
decide cases based upon personal whims rather than legal precedents and 
decisions. Furthermore, given the American case law system, the 
precedents set in high profile cases could have negatively affected future 
cases until they are either explicitly overruled or made invalid by a 
legislative act. Therefore, the idea that the media seems to affect the final 
decisions of the judiciary is a troubling one. While it is understandable that 
these high profile cases are hotly constested, it does not change the need of 
the courts to act independent of outside influence.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
As a society, it is important to understand that our actions can influence 
how judges decide cases, especially in these extremely important and 
high-profile decisions. We need to realize that judges are human beings 
that cannot be expected to completely divorce themselves from news 
topics or popular opinion polls. In these types of cases, judges do the best 
they can to maintain independence. In some cases, the public‘s pressure 
for a retributive decision is too hard to resist. It is important for judges to 
act in this manner because it serves to uphold the integrity of their 
decisions and to reaffirm the idea that the rule of law still is supreme in 
United States. But, as members of this society, we need to be cognizant of 
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the fact that the media can influence the final decisions of judges and act 
accordingly. It is understandable and, indeed, expected that we will have 
an opinion about a high profile case, but we must be aware of the fact that 
our hyperbolic statements or unfounded accusations written in news 
articles can influence the decision of a judge. I hasten to add that I am not 
advocating for a system of self-censorship or government censorship. 
Rather, I am urging that as a society we should encourage thoughtful 
reporting because of the impact it can have on the final decision in a high-
profile case.  
The independent judiciary is one of cornerstones of the American 
political system. In contentious cases, the independence of the judiciary is 
even more important to ensure that legal conclusions, rather than 
emotions, determine final verdicts and sentences. The NMT and Ghailani 
trial demonstrate the potential for judges to be influenced by the media. 
This finding calls into question whether the judicial system of the United 
States is truly independent from outside influence when outside opinions 
can have an effect on decisions reached at trial. Given the high profile 
nature of these cases as well as their ultimate precedential value, America 
should support the independent nature of its judiciary so that history will 
not have reason to condemn these decisions as retributive in nature and 
from a time where passions, rather than the law, ruled the judiciary. 
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